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Despite various planning efforts, airspace capacity can sometimes be exceeded, typically due to disruptive
events. Air traffic flow management (ATFM) is the process of managing flights in this situation. In this paper,
we present an ATFM model that accounts for different rerouting options (path rerouting and diversion) and
pre-existing en-route flights. The model proposes having a central authority to control all decisions, which is
then compared with current practice. We also consider inter-flight and inter-airline fairness measures in the
network. We use an exact approach to solve small-to-medium-sized instances, and we propose a modified
fix-and-relax heuristic to solve large-sized instances. Allowing a central authority to control all decisions
increases network efficiency compared to the case where the ATFM authority and airlines control decisions
independently. Our experiments show that including different rerouting options in ATFM can help reduce
delays by up to 8% and cancellations by up to 23%. Moreover, ground delay cost has much more impact
on network decisions than air delay cost, and network decisions are insensitive to changes in diversion cost.
Furthermore, the analysis of the trade-off between total network cost and overtaking cost shows that adding
costs for overtaking can significantly improve fairness at only a small increase in total system cost. A balanced
total cost per flight among airlines can be achieved at a small increase in the network cost (0.2 to 3.0%) when
imposing airline fairness. In conclusion, the comprehensiveness of the model makes it useful for analyzing a
wide range of alternatives for efficient ATFM.
Key words : Air traffic flow management; mathematical modeling; flight cancellation; flight diversion; path
rerouting; ground holding; airborne delay; flight overtaking
History :
1. Introduction
Flight schedule disruptions caused by severe climate weather, congestion, security issues, and tight
airport runway availability are disruptive events that lead airline companies, at the request of the
air traffic management authorities, to continuously modify their flight schedules (Deshpande and
Arıkan 2012). These modifications seek to minimize negative effects on schedules, such as flight
cancellations, rerouting, and delays (Barnhart and Cohn 2004, Hamdan et al. 2020).
All air traffic networks worldwide experience flight delays, diversions, cancellations, and rerout-
ings. For instance, in 2019, the United States reported more than 95.8 million delay minutes, of
which 24% were due to the airspace system (i.e. capacity issues), around 40% were due to late
aircraft arrivals, and 31% were carrier delays, with the remainder caused by weather and security
issues. Airspace system capacity was the trigger behind 24,775 out of the total 134,925 canceled
flights. Other causes of flight cancellations were categorized as carrier-related (28%) and weather-
related (18%). Furthermore, in the same year, 18,880 flights were diverted to alternative destination
airports, resulting in around 4.2 million arrival delay minutes (Bureau of Transportation Statistics
2019).
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Schedule modifications can be complex to handle, especially in dense traffic environments, and
are not necessarily based on optimal configurations, which means that they negatively affect system
performance for airspace stakeholders, resulting in financial losses, customer dissatisfaction, and
unfair allocation of airspace resources (Abdi and Sharma 2008, Jafari and Zegordi 2011).
In this work, we present an air traffic flow management (ATFM) optimization model that consid-
ers different realistic features such as diversions and path reroutings. Our objective is to increase the
system’s efficiency by minimizing the total cost of delays, reroutings, diversions and cancellations
in the network.
The ATFM resources need to be not only efficiently allocated but also fairly distributed (Bert-
simas, Farias, and Trichakis 2012), since an efficient ATFM schedule might not be accepted due
to fairness issues. Ways to achieve fairness should be based on the problem context (Fairbrother,
Zografos, and Glazebrook 2020). A schedule that prioritizes the planned arrival sequences and allo-
cates new arrival slots using a ration-by-schedule rule (first-scheduled first-served) is fair as agreed
by airlines (Bertsimas and Gupta 2015, Fairbrother, Zografos, and Glazebrook 2020). Another way
is to distribute delays among airlines based on the number of flights in each airline (Jacquillat and
Vaze 2018).
Here we address fairness by limiting overtaking between flights to prioritize the scheduled
sequences as far as the system capacity permits and by assigning a penalty for violating this fair-
ness. Overtaking between two flights can be defined as the number of periods between the entering
times of flights f and f ′ if f ′ enters a resource before f even though f was scheduled to enter
that resource before f ′. In addition to limiting overtaking, we promote fairness in the delay distri-
bution among flights. As overtaking and delay distribution are inter-flight fairness measures, i.e.
they are applied among flights without considering which airline they belong to, we also show how
the model can be extended to integrate inter-airline fairness, i.e. balancing the total cost between
different airlines. Thus, for a given network of resources (airports and airspace sectors), given flight
schedules in a finite time horizon, the proposed mathematical model is designed to address the
following questions while developing mitigation programs to respond to disruptions:
1. Which flight(s) (if any) should be held on the ground or made to reduce speed, for how long,
and what are the new departure and/or arrival times?
2. Which flight(s) (if any) should be canceled, and which should be diverted to a different arrival
airport?
3. Which flight(s) (if any) should be rerouted to avoid congested areas, and which alternative
routes are the best?
4. What is the optimal fair delay distribution among the schedules?
This paper complements the existing literature through the following contributions:
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 First, we account for all the features previously presented in the literature, i.e., continued
flights (flight pairs operated by the same aircraft, where the second flight is scheduled some time
after the arrival epoch of the first one), cancellation, path rerouting and speed control, all in the
same model. We also add new aspects not previously studied in the literature, i.e. diversion and en-
route flights that exist in the airspace at the beginning of the planning horizon. We illustrate that
the formulation structure makes it possible to relax the integrality constraint on the overtaking
decision variables. We then highlight the impact on the network decisions from considering different
rerouting aspects.
 Second, we focus on inter-flight fairness in the developed model by considering flight overtaking
and fairness in the delay distribution among different flights. The model is then extended to
account for inter-airline fairness. Analysis shows that airline fairness improvements can potentially
be achieved at a minimal cost.
 Third, since the ATFM authorities are responsible for the delays and the attendant overtaking
while airlines are responsible for diversions, cancellations, and rerouting decisions prior to take off,
we consider two groups of decisions and assign an importance weight to each group. Our method is
able to analyze the trade-off between the two groups of decisions in order to achieve certain goals
such as reducing delays and overtaking. The model therefore proposes that a central authority be
made responsible for better assigning/suggesting decisions to better utilize the airspace network.
This central authority approach is inspired by the collaborative decision-making philosophy that
advocates sharing the right information with the right entity at the right time (Ball et al. 2001).
It is also inline with the system-wide information management (SWIM) initiative that is currently
under development. SWIM aims to make all aviation-related information available in one unified
interface. It is expected to enable the establishment of a collaborative information environment
where stakeholders can proactively make collaborative decisions to improve planning (International
Civil Aviation Organization 2019). We compare the proposed central authority approach against
current practice, and show that having a central authority to assign all decisions can reduce total
system cost, particularly when considering fairness.
 Finally, we present a heuristic to solve the optimization model when it becomes intractable
(e.g. instances with high maximum allowable delay). The heuristic is a modified version of the
fix-and-relax algorithm that uses a modified fixing procedure. It has been validated by comparing
it against the exact solution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the relevant work on ATFM.
Section 3 discusses the problem under study. Section 4 presents the mathematical optimization
model. Section 5 explains how the proposed model can be adapted to simulate current practice.
Section 6 explains the heuristic approach used to solve the problem. Section 7 provides managerial
Author: Central authority controlled ATFM
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insights obtained from the numerical experiments. Section 8 concludes the paper and highlights
directions for future research.
2. Literature Review
In this section, we review and summarize relevant work done in ATFM, initially through the lens
of the evolution of the flight scheduling problem and then by discussing the macroscopic ATFM
model. We then present the microscopic ATFM model and conclude with literature findings and
research gaps.
2.1. ATFM evolution
The simplest version of the flight scheduling problem is the single-airport ground holding problem
that considers one airport and provides decisions on the aircraft release times (see, for instance,
Ball et al. 2003, Richetta and Odoni 1993). This problem then evolved (see Figure 1) into a multi-
airport ground holding problem that considers a network of airports and where delay propagates
as an aircraft flies continuously (Navazio and Romanin-Jacur 1998, Vranas, Bertsimas, and Odoni
1994). Single-airport and multi-airport models lack the ability to control aircraft speed and flight
path, and they also fail to consider en-route sector capacity. The ATFM problem can be seen as
an extended version of the multi-airport ground holding problem in that it considers these features
with an ultimate goal of balancing the flight schedules (arrivals and departures) in the airports
with sector capacities (Agust́ın et al. 2012a,b, Bertsimas and Patterson 1998, Bertsimas and Gupta
2015). Odoni (1987) was among the first to address this problem as a mathematical optimization
problem.
Figure 1 Evolution of the ATFM problem in the literature
2.2. Macroscopic ATFM models
Macroscopic ATFM models are the network models that consider the number of flights rather than
a flight-by-flight case. In this variant, Andreatta, Dell’Olmo, and Lulli (2011) presented a multi-
stage stochastic ATFM model that considers continued flights and the trade-off between arrival and
departure capacities, and formulates interactions between different hubs. This model represents
an extension of the deterministic version in Dell’Olmo and Lulli (2003). Mukherjee and Hansen
(2009) developed three stochastic ATFM models, i.e. static ground holding without rerouting, static
ground holding with static rerouting, and static ground holding with dynamic rerouting. These
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models can be seen as extensions of the model proposed in Ball et al. (2003). Chen, Chen, and
Sun (2017) proposed a chance-constrained programming model to solve an ATFM problem using
a polynomial approximation-based approach that is based on the Bernstein polynomial approach
for large-scale problems.
2.3. Microscopic ATFM models
The rich literature investigates different aspects of a flight-by-flight ATFM and proposes different
model variants. Bertsimas and Patterson (1998) formulated a mathematical optimization model
that addresses the deterministic ATFM problem. They showed how the model can be reduced to
a multi-airport ground delay problem, and how it can be extended to account for rerouting, the
dependency between runway arrival and departure capacities, and the case of banks of flights (in
a hub-and-spoke system). Lulli and Odoni (2007) introduced the fairness and equity decisions in a
deterministic European ATFM model with a slight super-linear delay function that assigns airborne
delays only at terminal airspace around destination airports. Bertsimas, Lulli, and Odoni (2011)
developed a deterministic model to solve large-scale instances with fairness as in Lulli and Odoni
(2007). Gupta and Bertsimas (2011) presented a robust and adaptive stochastic ATFM model that
was solved optimally using piecewise affine policies.
Inspired by Bertsimas and Patterson (1998) and Mukherjee and Hansen (2005), Agust́ın et al.
(2012a) proposed a deterministic multi-objective mixed-integer binary model using arc formulation
for the flight-by-flight ATFM problem. They illustrated how the model can consider dependency
between arrival and departure capacity, dynamic sector structure, and some airline-related con-
straints such as a maximum amount of delay per airline. The stochastic version is given in Agust́ın
et al. (2012b). Bertsimas and Gupta (2015) extended the basic ATFM model proposed in Bertsi-
mas and Patterson (1998) into a two-stage model that accounts for minimizing delays and limiting
overtaking in its first stage while considering airline slot allocation in its second stage. Hamdan
et al. (2018) studied the effect of rerouting on the ATFM network with fairness. Garćıa-Heredia,
Alonso-Ayuso, and Molina (2019) considered dynamic sector configuration in an ATFM model.
2.4. Literature findings and research gaps
Table 1 summarizes the features of the models presented in the literature and classifies them based
on information level (microscopic or macroscopic), capacity certainty (deterministic or stochastic),
inclusion of fairness measures, and model decisions.
In this work, we present a flexible approach to optimally schedule flights in a given planning
horizon while considering all elements in the air traffic network and a comprehensive set of decisions,
i.e. rerouting, diversion, cancellation, ground delay, airborne delay and speed control. Note that
this work also takes into account, for the first time, the en-route flights that already exist in
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Bertsimas and Patterson (1998) 3 × 3 × × 3 3 3 × × × × × ×
Bertsimas and Patterson (2000) 3 × 3 × × 3 3 3 × × × × × ×
Alonso-Ayuso, Escudero, and Ortuno
(2000)
3 × × 3 × 3 × 3 × × × × × ×
Nilim, El Ghaoui, and Duong (2003) 3 × × 3 × × 3 × × × × × × ×
Lulli and Odoni (2007) 3 × 3 × 3 × × × × × × × × ×
Bertsimas, Lulli, and Odoni (2008) 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 × × × × × ×
Mukherjee and Hansen (2009) × 3 × 3 × × 3 × × × × × × ×
Andreatta, Dell’Olmo, and Lulli
(2011)
× 3 × 3 3 × × 3 × × × × × ×
Bertsimas, Lulli, and Odoni (2011) 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 × × × × × ×
Agust́ın et al. (2012a) 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 3 × × × × ×
Agust́ın et al. (2012b) 3 × × 3 3 3 3 3 3 × × × × ×
Gupta and Bertsimas (2011) 3 × × 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 × × × ×
Bertsimas and Gupta (2015) 3 × 3 × 3 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 × ×
Chen, Chen, and Sun (2017) × 3 × 3 × × × × × × × × × ×
Hamdan et al. (2018) 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 × 3 × × × ×
Garćıa-Heredia, Alonso-Ayuso, and
Molina (2019)
3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 × × × × × ×
This work 3 × 3 × 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 × 3 3
the airspace at the beginning of the planning horizon. Moreover, and to the best of the authors’
knowledge, diversion to alternative airports has never before been taken into account in previous
ATFM research. Furthermore, we account for both inter-flight and inter-airline fairness, and we
analyze the trade-off between ATFM authority decisions and airline decisions.
3. Problem Statement
In this section, we describe the problem studied and the different network decisions used. We then
define the considered fairness measures and evaluation metrics, before going on to frame the role
of decision-makers and the cost parameters.
3.1. Problem definition and network decisions
This work studies the ATFM problem that consists of a set of flights (F) in a planning horizon
(T ) of finite time periods (t∈ T ) that will fly through an airspace network. The airspace network
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includes a set of airports (K) and a set of sectors (P). Each airport and sector in this network has
its own capacity at a given time-period (t) in the planning horizon. Each flight has a predefined
set of time-periods (time-window) for arrival at each resource (T f,zj ). The first time-period in this
set represents the earliest possible time determined by the scheduled plan and the minimum time
to be spent in each resource (lfj ). The last time-period corresponds to the latest possible time
calculated based on the planning horizon or the maximum allowable delay. The ATFM authority
may delay some flights to achieve better utilization of the limited capacities, and airlines may
decide to reroute (prior to a flight’s take-off), cancel or divert some of their flights to minimize
their costs. The ATFM authority and airlines take decisions independently (although following
certain information-sharing protocols and approvals), which may not necessarily result in efficient
utilization of airspace. In this context, we present an ATFM model in which the decisions are taken
by a central authority, in a spirit that builds on initiatives aligned to a system of collaborative
air traffic management. The goal is to find a minimum-cost solution to the problem, using all the
available actions, and not exceeding the capacity of airports and sectors.
In this problem, we consider that at any time in the day, in addition to the flights scheduled to
depart (FG), there are always en-route flights (FA) in the airspace at the beginning of the planning
horizon. These flights are accounted for by defining them as a new set of flights accompanied with
a new set of constraints while considering their current sector at the beginning of the planning
horizon and keeping the remaining time in this sector while forcing the model not to cancel any of
them. Long-haul flights that will not be able to reach their destination by the end of the planning
horizon are modeled to arrive at a virtual high-capacity airport at the end of the planning horizon.
In a flight diversion, a flight in a sector, which is usually close to its original destination airport,
can start navigating to its new path leading to its alternative airport, as shown in Figure 2.
To properly model continued flights, it is necessary to include the time required to unload, clean,
refuel, load, and any other preparation needed to ready the aircraft for its next flight. This time is
known as the turnaround time (Bertsimas and Patterson 1998). If an aircraft is delayed, then this
delay may propagate to its next flight.
3.2. Fairness measures and evaluation metrics
We consider inter-airline and inter-flight fairness measures. Inter-airline fairness is considered in
the balancing of the cost per flight for each airline. Introducing a fairness coefficient (Π) makes it
possibly to distribute the schedule modifications fairly. Inter-flight fairness measures include a fair
allocation of delays among flights using a slight super-linear coefficient, and limiting overtaking
between flights to preserve the scheduled sequences.
In some cases, the problem can have several optimal solutions, i.e. alternate optima, having the
same total delays but with different allocations. We therefore raise the delay duration to a slight
Author: Central authority controlled ATFM
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Figure 2 Flight diversion: the original flight path is from A to H. Sector F represents the transition sector
(common to the two paths). The flight diverts at F to land at an alternative airport through sectors I,
J and finally K
super-linear coefficient (1+ϕ) to promote fairness between flights such that instead of assigning a
large amount of delay to only few flights, the delay is shared among a larger number of flights.
Definition 1. A slight super-linear coefficient (1+ϕ) is a weighting factor on the delay duration.
It is used to distinguish between the different delay allocations in cases with the same total delay.
For example, a solution that assigns two units of delay to one flight and zero units to another
flight has the same total delay (2 + 0) as a solution that assigns one unit of delay for each of the
two flights (1 + 1). However, the second solution is assumed to provide more fairness as delays
are distributed among the flights. If we raise the delay duration to a slight super-linear coefficient
(1+ϕ), this results in 2(1+ϕ) total delay for the first solution and 1(1+ϕ) + 1(1+ϕ) for the second
solution. Now, the second solution has lower weighted delay value and is consequently selected.
As part of the inter-flight fairness consideration, the model restricts the amount of overtaking
between the flights by assigning a penalty to each time unit of overtaking. In other words, it assigns
a penalty for violating the scheduled sequence, which preserves arrival sequences.
Definition 2. Overtaking between flight pair (f, f ′) at resource j is the time difference (or the
number of time-periods) between the arrival of flight f ′ at resource j and the arrival of flight f at
the same resource if and only if flight f is scheduled to arrive before flight f ′ at resource j but flight
f ′ arrives before f (Bertsimas and Gupta 2015). This may occur under the following conditions:
1. The two flights share the same resource, i.e. both flight f and flight f ′ have resource j in their
path.
2. There are at least two common time-periods between the two flights within their feasible
time-sets (time-windows).
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j are the first and last possible time-periods (earliest and latest possible times)
for flight f to arrive at resource j from path z, respectively. The maximum amount of overtaking
is T f,zj −T
f ′,z′






j + 1, ..., T
f,z
j − 1.
Figure 3 shows the landing time-window at the same airport for two flights, Flight A and Flight
B. The earliest arrival times for Flights A and B are t= 2 and t= 4, respectively, and the latest
arrival times for Flights A and B are t= 6 and t= 9, respectively. The common arrival time slots
are t= 4,5, and 6. If both flights arrive at their earliest time (Figure 3(a)) or if Flight A arrives at
t= 4 and Flight B arrives at t= 5 (Figure 3(b)), then there will be no reversal as the sequence is
preserved. However, if Flight B arrives at t= 4 and Flight A arrives at t= 6, then the scheduled
arrival sequence is violated, where Flight B overtook Flight A by two periods (Figure 3(c)).
Figure 3 Possible arrival times of Flights A and B to the same airport and potential arrival scenarios
To evaluate network fairness, we use price of fairness and degree of fairness as performance
indicators. The price of fairness represents the relative percentage cost increase associated with
incorporating fairness in the network, i.e. the efficiency loss due to fairness (Bertsimas, Farias, and
Trichakis 2011). It is measured with respect to a network case that does not impose fairness and
helps to understand the trade-off between fairness and efficiency. The degree of fairness measures
how close a solution is to the fairest one, and thus indicates a fairness level that ranges from 0 to
1, where 0 represents a solution that is far from the fairest one.
3.3. Role of decision-makers and the cost structure
Since decisions are controlled either by the ATFM authority (delays and consequently overtaking)
or the airlines (rerouting, diversion and cancellation), we use the weighted sum approach (which
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is a scalarization technique in multiobjective optimization) by multiplying each group’s decision
costs by an importance weight. These importance weights can be seen as coefficients to control the
cost parameters of each group. This approach makes it possible to study the interaction between
the two sets of decisions and to find the best combination of decisions that minimizes the total
network cost. It also allows to determine the trade-off between the two sets of decisions. Most of
the cost parameters are obtained from a EUROCONTROL report (EUROCONTROL 2018). Delay
costs (Cfair, C
f
ground) cover fuel, safety, compensation and taxes (Bertsimas and Patterson 2000).
Ground holding cost (Cfground) is generally cheaper than air holding cost (C
f
air) because of the fuel
burn and safety issues. Cancellation cost (Cfcancel) includes service recovery costs, goodwill costs,
loss of revenue, passenger compensation, and crew and catering costs (EUROCONTROL 2018).
Rerouting penalty cost (Cf,zreroute) includes the charges for using alternative paths to the planned
one (Agust́ın et al. 2012a). Likewise, diversion cost (Cf,zAlt) accounts for the route and airport
charges in addition to costs for transporting passengers to their scheduled destination. Overtaking
cost (CfRairport, C
f
Rsector) represents the fairness penalty, which includes missed connections and
compensation, schedule integrity, and operational constraints at the airport.
4. Modeling and Optimization Formulation
In this section, we introduce the formulation of the ATFM model with different rerouting options
that account for speed control, path rerouting, diversion, cancellation, and overtaking. We show
how this model can be extended to account for inter-airline fairness. The following subsections
define the sets, parameters, objective function and constraints of the proposed mixed-integer linear
programming (MILP) model.
4.1. Sets
 FG: set of flights scheduled to depart from any airport in the network,
 FA: set of en-route flights, i.e. flights that already exist in the airspace at the beginning of the
planning horizon,
 F : set of all flights F =FG ∪FA, indexed by f ,
 A: set of airlines, indexed by h,
 Gh: set of flights that belongs to airline h, Gh ⊆F ,
 T : set of discrete finite time-periods of 15-min duration, indexed by t,
 K: set of airports in the network, indexed by k,
 Zf : set of routes belonging to flight f including the scheduled route, indexed by z,
 P: set of all sectors in the network,
 Pzf : set of sectors that flight f is supposed to follow in route z (Pzf ⊆P),
Author: Central authority controlled ATFM
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 PAlt,zf : set of sectors that flight f will use to divert to another landing airport from route z
(PAlt,zf ⊆P),
 Rj: set of reversible flights at a resource j, j ∈ P ∪K. Each element in this set contains the
pairs of flights that are reversible and their corresponding route (f, z, f ′, z′),
 C: set of pairs of flights that are continued (f, f ′) ∈ C, where f represents the flight that will
use the same aircraft after the arrival of its preceding flight f ′,
 T f,zj : list of predefined possible flight time-periods for flight f in resource j ∈ Pzf ∪P
Alt,z
f ∪K,
i.e. airport or sector, using path z ∈Zf according to the schedule including all possible delays,
 T f,f
′,z,z′
j : set of overtaking intervals between flight f using path z and flight f











The cost-related parameters are:
 Cfair, C
f
ground: penalty cost of one-time unit for delaying a flight in the air or for delaying the
departure of a flight, respectively,
 CfRairport, C
f
Rsector: costs of overtaking per period at the arrival airport and sector, respectively,
for flight f ,
 Cfcancel : penalty cost for canceling flight f ,




 Cf,zAlt: cost of rerouting flight f to an alternative landing airport while using route z.
The flight and network parameters are:
 originf : departure airport of flight f ,
 destf : scheduled destination airport of flight f ,
 destAltf : alternative destination airport of flight f ,
 X zf,j, Yzf,j: preceding and subsequent sectors, respectively, of the jth sector for flight f in route
z,
 XAlt,zf,j , Y
Alt,z
f,j : preceding and subsequent sectors, respectively, of the j
th sector in the z path
to the alternative airport for flight f ,
 Uzf : the first sector in the path of flight f ,
 UAlt,zf : the sector in set Pzf after which flight f can divert to an alternative destination airport
while using path z. It is the first sector in the set PAlt,zf ,
 Dk(t): departure capacity of airport k at time t,
 Ak(t): arrival capacity of airport k at time t,
 Sj(t): capacity of sector j in the network at time t,
 aj,zf : scheduled arrival time of flight f to resource j using route z,
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 df : scheduled departure time of flight f ,
 zs: index used to indicate the scheduled route of a flight,
 lfj : minimum time for flight f to spend in sector j, which corresponds to flying at the maximum
allowable speed,
 sf : minimum turnaround time needed for flight f to take off after the arrival of flight f
′ in





j : first and last time-period in set T
f,z
j that represent the earliest possible time and
the possible time, respectively, for flight f to enter resource j using route z. T f,zj can be calculated
based on maximum allowable flight delay (a predefined value) or based on number of time-periods







 ϕ: small value representing the fairness in delay distribution and used to have slight super-
linear cost coefficients in the ground and air delays,
 π1 and π2: importance weights of the ATFM authority decisions and airline decisions, respec-
tively. Note that π1 +π2 = 1.0,
 Π: airline fairness coefficient.
4.3. Decision variables
The decision variables used in the ATFM model are:
 wf,zj,t : a binary variable equal to one if flight f has arrived at resource j, j 6= originf , or taken
off from j = originf by time t using path z. Otherwise, it is equal to zero. If w
f,z
j,t = 1 at any period
t, then it will be equal to one for all the later periods,
 rt,z,z
′
j,f,f ′ : a binary variable equal to one if a reversal occurs between flight f from route z and
flight f ′ from route z′ at resource j and at period t. Otherwise, it is equal to zero.
The additional variables used in the inter-airline fairness model (see Section 4.5) are:
 Bh: continuous decision variable that represents the total cost per flight for airline h,
 B: continuous decision variable that represents the average total cost per flight,
 Jh: continuous decision variable that represents the deviation of the total cost per flight of
airline h from the average total cost per flight.
4.4. MILP model
In this section, we give the MILP model for the ATFM problem. Note that due to the formulation
structure, the integrality constraint for decision variables rt,z,z
′
j,f,f ′ can be relaxed in the case of π1 6= 0,
CfRsector 6= 0 and C
f
Rairport 6= 0 (readers can refer to Section A in the Supplementary material for
further details).
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k,t−1) ≤ Ak(t), k ∈K, t∈ T ,
(3)
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j,f,f ′ ≤ 1,






j,f,f ′ ≤ 1,








j,f,f ′ ≤ 0,






j,f,f ′ ∈ {0,1}. (18)
The objective function (1) minimizes the total network cost, which consists of the ground delay
cost and the air delay cost for the scheduled flights for each airline h in Equations (1a) and (1b), and
the air delay cost for the en-route flights (1c), the sector (1d) and destination airport (1e) overtaking
penalty costs, the cancellation penalty cost for the scheduled flights (1f), the path rerouting penalty
cost (1g) and the diversion penalty cost (1h). Note that Equation (1b) calculates the total delay, and
so in Equation (1a) we multiply the total ground delay by parameter Cfair so that it is subtracted
from the total delay in Equation (1b) when (1a) and (1b) are combined. This will result in the
total ground delay and the total air delay. Note also that the first five terms (C1h through C
5
h) in the
objective function are the costs resulting from ATFM authority decisions for each airline h, while
the remaining terms are the costs resulting from airline decisions. Parameters π1 and π2 are the
Author: Central authority controlled ATFM
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importance weights of the ATFM authority decisions and the airline decisions, respectively. These
weights are used to obtain the weighted sum formulation. As mentioned earlier, these weights can
be seen as a tool to balance the two types of decisions and find the best combination that minimizes
total network cost, but also to analyze the trade-off between ATFM authority decisions and airline
decisions.
Note that a dummy period (t = 0) needs to be added in the implementation to capture the
situation where a flight may depart at t= 1. The value of wf,zj,t should be set to 0 at this dummy
period.
Constraints (2) and (3) ensure that the number of flights that depart from or arrive at an airport
does not exceed the predefined capacity of departures or arrivals for each period in the planning
horizon. While Constraint (2) is applicable only for the scheduled flights’ set, Constraint (3) is for
both the scheduled and the en-route flights’ sets.
Constraint (4) ensures that no sector capacity is exceeded. More specifically, in every time-period
t, the total number of flights in a sector that still has not entered their next sectors (in the regular
path or diversion path) shall not exceed the sector capacity at that time-period. This constraint
consists of three parts. The first part counts a flight if sector j is on its regular path (non-diversion
path). The second part counts a flight if sector j is on its diversion path (except the common sector
between the regular and diversion path). The last part counts a flight if sector j is a transition
sector, i.e. the next sector is part of the flight’s regular path or its diversion path.
Constraints (5) and (6) ensure that if a flight departs or if it is in its first sector (for the en-route
flights), then it must arrive at its destination airport or its alternative destination airport (if any).
These constraints are needed to ensure continuity in the path between starting point (departure
airport/first sector) and ending point (arrival airport).
Constraints (7) and (8) are the rerouting constraints, where Constraint (7) forces en-route flights
to follow one path without allowing the possibility of flight cancellation, and Constraint (8) limits
the number of selected paths for any other flight to at most one, which indicates that these flights
might be canceled.
Constraint (9) is the time connectivity constraint, where if wf,zj,t = 1 in period t, then it should
also equal one for all the later periods. Constraints (10)-(12) represent the path connectivity that
ensures a flight cannot enter the next sector in its path unless it has spent at least the minimum
allowable time in its current sector. Constraint (10) is for the connectivity of the normal (non-
diversion) path of a flight, and Constraint (11) is for the connectivity of the path used for diversion.
Constraint (12) allows a flight to select one decision regarding diversion to another airport, i.e.
either to continue its normal path to the scheduled landing airport or to divert and follow a new
set of sectors to another airport.
Author: Central authority controlled ATFM
18 Article submitted to Transportation Science; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!)
Constraint (13) links the continued flights so that an aircraft scheduled to perform a continued
flight cannot depart unless it has spent at least its specified turnaround duration after the arrival
of its previous flight to the scheduled destination airport. In this case, a continued flight will be
canceled if its previous flight has been canceled or diverted to another destination airport.
Equations (14)-(17) are the overtaking constraints to count if flight f ′ overtakes flight f at time t
in a common resource j. Finally, Constraint (18) defines the decision variables as binary variables.
4.5. ATFM with airline fairness
The previous mathematical formulation can be extended to account for fairness among airlines.


































Bh,B ≥ 0, h∈A. (21)
The new objective function component (1i) minimizes the total absolute deviation of airline
cost per flight from the average value. Constraint (19) calculates the airline cost per flight for
each airline, Constraint (20) calculates the average cost per flight, and Constraint (21) is the
non-negativity constraint. Note here that since the objective function is minimized, the non-linear
objective function component can be made linear by adding one decision variable set and two















Jh ≥Bh−B, h∈A, (22)
Jh ≥B−Bh, h∈A. (23)
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The term C9 can be added to the previous objective function (1). Note that minimizing term C9
only may lead to an unnecessary increase in total cost per flight to facilitate achieving a balanced
situation. Therefore, the total cost (presented in Equation (1)) needs to be considered to prevent
any unnecessary increase in the cost. Note that Equation (19) can be modified if one wishes to
focus on fairly distributing one cost component among airlines (e.g. delay costs or overtaking costs)
rather than the total cost per flight.
5. Simulating the Current Practice
Here we illustrate how the proposed central authority ATFM model can be adapted to simulate
the current practice using a two-stage ATFM. Decisions on flights are taken independently by the
ATFM authority and the airlines. The process starts when airlines share their planned schedules
with the ATFM authority. The ATFM authority decides on flight delays (and consequently the
resulting overtaking) and shares the updated schedules with the airlines. Each airline tries to
minimize its own cost using rerouting, diversion, and cancellation decisions while integrating the
delays obtained from the ATFM authority. They update their schedules and share them back
with the ATFM authority. The process continues until no further modifications are made. Current
practice can be simulated using the model proposed in this paper with some modifications, and
then compared with our proposed approach of having a central decision-making authority. This
comparison will be addressed in Section 7.
The following steps illustrate how the model proposed in Section 4 can be modified to simulate
the current practice:









h in Equation (1)), by setting the other costs to a number large enough to rule
them out.
2. Each airline (h∈A) tries to minimize its own costs using rerouting, diversion and cancellation
decisions while setting the delay obtained from Step 1 as an upper bound. In this step, the schedules
of other airlines are fixed and kept unchanged, as an airline can only modify its own schedules.
The optimization model is solved for each airline individually.
3. The schedule changes, i.e. reroutings, diversions and cancellations from Step 2 from all airlines,
are sent back to the ATFM authority to re-optimize the delays.
4. The process iterates until no further changes are made, and if the process does not converge
to a solution, the solution with the lowest cost is selected.
6. The Solution Process
The mathematical model presented in Section 4 is solved using the branch-and-cut algorithm in
CPLEX solver 12.8.0. A solution can be obtained quicker by limiting the maximum allowable delay
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and the number of flights that can be rerouted (as done in Section 7). However, if the maximum
allowable delay, the number of flights that can be rerouted, and the other features are not limited,
then computational time increases considerably, and the model becomes intractable.
In the following sections, we therefore introduce a modified version of the fix-and-relax heuristic
to solve the ATFM with different rerouting options and provide decision-makers with a good trade-
off between solution quality and resolution time.
6.1. Heuristic basics
Here we briefly present the proposed heuristic. Readers can refer to Section B in the Supplementary
material for a detailed description.
The heuristic is a modified version of the conventional fix-and-relax heuristic, which has been
widely applied with success in scheduling problems (Beraldi et al. 2008, Mohammadi et al. 2010,
Uggen, Fodstad, and Nørstebø 2013). The fix-and-relax algorithm starts with a relaxed optimization
problem and partitions the integer decision variables into groups. In each iteration, it fixes the
binary variables of the previous iteration to their optimal values, sets the next group of variables as
integers, and solves the problem until the last iteration is reached. It partitions the problem either
row-wise or column-wise. Even though the modified fix-and-relax algorithm uses partitioning of the
decision variables, we are only utilizing it in the first iteration so as to get a starting-point solution.
In addition, we are partitioning using row-wise and column-wise simultaneously by defining a block
that contains some of the rows and columns of the decision variable. In the other iterations, the
fix-and-set processes are done on the variables with non-integer solutions. In addition to that, in
each iteration the algorithm checks whether the resulting solution is entirely integer or not. The
algorithm terminates when the resulting solution is entirely integer. These modifications save a
huge amount of computational time compared with the row-wise or column-wise approaches.
6.2. Heuristic validation
The proposed heuristic performs well compared to the optimal solution of the exact approach.
Performance was judged using 25 instances. The instances were chosen to cover various situations
by varying the number of flights, the number of sectors, and the number of airports. The heuristic
was implemented using Julia Programming Language 1.4.0 (Bezanson et al. 2017). The analysis was
carried out using a computer equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700 CPU @ 3.2 GHz and 16
Gb of RAM, and running Windows 10 Enterprise 64-bit operating system. A time limit of five hours
was used to terminate the solver in the exact approach. Table 2 summarizes the statistics of the 25
instances, their computational time, and the optimal objective value using the exact and heuristic
approaches. Figure 4 shows the gap value between the heuristic and the exact solutions and the time
saving for each instance, where the gap is calculated as 100× Heuristic optimal value−Exact optimal value
Exact optimal value
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and the time saving is calculated as 100× Exact time−Heuristic time
Exact time
. Note that the gap between the
heuristic solution and the exact solution is less than 2%. The heuristic was able to save an average
86.2% of the exact-solution time, and found good solutions in around 24 minutes for the cases
where the exact approach instances reached the time limit.
Table 2 Instance details, computational times, and optimal values using the exact and heuristic approaches


















1 2000 100 80 20 6 648490 757745 56.97 13.19 2977843 2994192
2 2000 100 50 20 6 849025 1224915 49.48 10.21 1561810 1562016
3 2000 100 50 20 6 782924 1085026 37.67 21.32 1695284 1702017
4† 2500 100 50 20 6 2844778 3466085 300.00 17.49 833984 837343
5† 2500 100 50 20 6 2781608 3427712 300.00 24.68 1945268 1945267
6† 2500 100 50 20 5 2360213 2903799 300.00 5.13 2753726 2753726
7# 2500 100 50 20 5 4940592 6083877 300.00 19.49 - 1890127
8 2500 100 50 20 5 1158923 1510333 250.76 22.46 5496335 5498541
9 2500 100 50 20 6 1506510 1908330 139.25 25.21 1272724 1273430
10 2500 100 50 20 7 1481847 1863358 118.69 17.24 1812116 1812116
11 2500 100 50 20 5 1284136 1638204 107.37 4.96 5847822 5847822
12 2500 100 50 20 5 768125 1007106 34.49 19 4332753 4334124
13 2500 100 50 20 6 837702 1089997 32.28 11.57 5359030 5359042
14† 3000 100 50 20 6 1632680 2072309 300.00 26.72 1944169 1946490
15† 3000 100 50 20 6 2461675 3152897 300.00 33.15 955681 962460
16† 3000 100 50 20 6 2040735 2631817 300.00 26.80 6113883 6111600
17† 3000 100 50 20 6 1164662 1382711 300.00 30.37 827313 836799
18# 3000 100 50 20 5 1957043 2482765 300.00 32.66 - 8774690
19 3000 100 50 20 6 1725204 2192569 271.72 16.74 1032794 1051176
20 3000 100 50 20 6 1676537 2130742 207.47 21.09 5909013 5909013
21 3000 100 50 20 6 2107920 2765595 189.97 12.51 953316 953318
22 3000 100 50 20 6 2054249 2679736 143.62 5.17 2154493 2154493
23 3000 100 50 20 6 2278938 2910739 100.94 3.53 623801 623801
24 3000 100 50 20 6 2207611 2835951 98.13 4.2 1702723 1702723
25 3000 100 50 20 6 1639260 2037447 95.39 3.54 2509125 2509125
* APL: the average path length.
# Exact solver could not find a solution within the time limit.
† Exact solver stopped due to the time limit.
7. Managerial Insights
We conducted various numerical studies in order to tease out managerial insights. The purpose of
this section is to illustrate how the model with its new features can help decision-makers to achieve
better airspace utilization. We used six instances with 96 time periods of 15 minutes each, which
gives a total period of 24 hours and a number of flights that varies between 1000 to 3000 distributed
over 25 airports with 100 en-route flights in the airspace at the beginning of the day. Each data set
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Figure 4 Heuristic performance compared to the exact solution in terms of the gap and the time saving. Dark
grey bars identify the instances where no exact solution was found within the time limit and the gap
is set to -100%
has 20% connecting flights. Ten major airline companies operate these flights. In each data set, 5%
of the airports are considered the busiest, handling around 40% of the traffic. These instances were
generated randomly, and the cost parameters were obtained from the EUROCONTROL report
(EUROCONTROL 2018). The airspace is divided into 10×10 cells, each cell representing a sector.
The flight trajectory from the origin to the destination airport for each flight is based on the
shortest path, which yields the sequence of sectors and the corresponding distances.
Each flight is given an aircraft type, and the minimum required time in each sector is thus
determined from the cruising speed (based on the aircraft type) and the distance (based on the
flight trajectory). If a flight has a diversion option, then the nearest airport is identified and an
additional path from a specific sector to the alternative airport is generated.
Moreover, in cases where a flight can be rerouted, two alternative paths can be generated by
moving to one of the adjacent sectors (in any of the four directions) at the beginning of the
flight path and then following a straight path to the destination airport. It was assumed that the
maximum allowable delay for any flight is 1 hour 30 minutes, which is equivalent to 6 time-periods
(of 15 minutes each). This assumption allows solving the six instances optimally using CPLEX
12.8.0 within 30 minutes. Most of the cost parameters used in this analysis were obtained from
EUROCONTROL (2018), and are as follows: Cfair =AC2190 per time-period, C
f
ground =AC1350 per
time-period, Cfcancel =AC96695 per flight, C
f,z
Alt =AC7400 per flight. Overtaking cost was assumed to
be equal to the value of the ATFM slot swapping cost stated in the Eurocontrol report (CfRairport =
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CfRsector = AC4600 per time-period). Rerouting cost was assumed to be C
f,z
reroute = AC700 per flight.
The airport departure and arrival capacities and the airspace sector capacities were generated
randomly in the range of 10 to 15 flights per time-period. Table 3 summarizes the remaining details
of the instances.
In what follows, we compare the proposed central authority model against the current prac-
tice. We investigate the impact of the important new features presented in this model (rerouting,
diversion, overtaking, and airline fairness) on the ATFM network. Furthermore, we explore the
trade-off between delays and overtaking and rerouting, diversion and cancellation. The analysis of
these issues is structured into six observations. Note that in Observations 1 to 5, the importance
weights are set to equal (π1 = π2 = 0.5).















1 1000 100 45 32 2-19 862556 972241
2 2000 100 95 50 2-18 560235 516622
3 2000 100 95 47 2-21 605034 504265
4 2000 100 95 50 2-21 688659 601206
5 3000 100 145 70 2-19 1116316 1085664
6 3000 100 145 89 2-21 1076671 944057
Observation 1: Having a central authority to assign all decisions can reduce the total
system cost, particularly when enforcing fairness.
Table 4 illustrates the results of simulating the current practice (presented in Section 5) using an
iterative approach and the results of applying the proposed central authority model using equal
weights (π1 = π2 = 0.5) under no airline fairness (Π = 0) and full airline fairness (Π = 1000). The
iteration limit is set to 25 iterations, where one iteration includes the ATFM authority optimization
and airline optimization independently and then preparing a list of all changes and sharing it with
the ATFM authority for the next iteration.
The solution of instances 1 and 5 without considering airline fairness and the solution of instance
2 considering airline fairness failed to improve the performance using rerouting, diversion and
cancellation when executed independently from the delay decisions (Table 4). Using rerouting,
diversion and cancellation enhanced the solution of the remaining instances by an average of 34.6%
when airline fairness is not considered. This percentage increases more than 10-fold when airline
fairness is considered. This first observation shows the benefit of incorporating airline decisions
in the process. Moreover, allowing a central authority to control all decisions results in a fur-
ther 1.8%–7.6% cost reduction when not considering airline fairness, which is a relatively small
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Table 4 Comparison between the current practice and the proposed approach





The current practice [iterative and independent decisions]
Total cost - FI# (AC) 982225 922519 18151642 13698994 2412881 5911224
Total cost - LI## (AC) 982225 912666 4538699 5874394 2412881 5601533
Iteration* 3 3 14 5 3 10
Our proposed approach [central decision-making authority]
Total cost (AC) 907166.6 896443.4 4216746 5770166 2255433 5325571
Improvements
LI vs. FI (%) 0.0 1.1 75.0 57.1 0.0 5.2





The current practice [iterative and independent decisions]
Total cost - FI (AC) 1095423 930586 15831970 25614121 30080063 28697823
Total cost - LI (AC) 998532 930586 7151579 6896822 2426345 5668478
Iteration** 3 3 8 15 3 10
Our proposed approach [central decision-making authority]
Total cost (AC) 933732 905090 4246439 5781051 2270050 5360701
Improvements
LI vs. FI (%) 9.70 0.0 121.38 271.39 1139.73 406.27





* Instances 3 and 4 did not converge to a solution and the best cost is found at the indicated iteration.
** Instance 4 did not converge to a solution and the best cost is found at the indicated iteration.
improvement. However, under airline fairness, the central authority approach can achieve a further
reduction of 18.35% on average (Table 4).
This indicates that airspace may be better utilized at a lower cost if one entity controls all
decisions. Having a central authority may lead to a fully transparent collaborative decision-making
system, where all airlines share information about their flight preferences, such as preferred routes
and other acceptable routes, and let a central authority decide on the best actions. Note that the
airline shares its information with the airport authorities and the ATFM authorities but not with
other airlines, in order to ensure confidentiality and fair competition.
Without considering airline fairness, the feasibility of the central authority approach will be
highly dependent on the readiness of communication systems from other projects such as SWIM and
the required level of administrative effort. Considering airlines fairness, the savings are potentially
much higher, giving more incitement to use the central authority.
Observation 2: Introducing rerouting and diversion options reduces the total cost,
and the network decisions are insensitive to the increase in diversion cost.
Three scenarios were developed to examine the effect of rerouting and diversion on the total delay
periods and the total number of cancellations. These scenarios are: ATFM with rerouting only,
ATFM with diversion only, ATFM with rerouting and diversion. The changes in the total delay
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(a) Effect of rerouting and diversion on the total delays and cancellations
(b) Effect of rerouting and diversion on the total cost
Figure 5 Impact of rerouting and diversion decisions
periods, total number of cancellations and total cost are observed by comparing the results of these
scenarios against the ‘ATFM without rerouting and diversion’ scenario. Figure 5 shows the impact
of considering rerouting and diversion. The boxplot (Figure 5a) summarizes the effect of considering
the three scenarios—rerouting only, diversion only, and ATFM with rerouting and diversion—on
the total delay periods and cancellations for the six instances. Figure 5b illustrates the reduction
in total cost under the three scenarios.
Rerouting only (Scenario 1) results in up to a 7.5% reduction in delay among all instances with
no canceled flights. For the instances with canceled flights, rerouting reduces cancellations by up
Author: Central authority controlled ATFM
26 Article submitted to Transportation Science; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!)
to 20.8% with a slight increase of up to 9.5% in total delay (Figure 5a). In addition, rerouting
also saves 5% in total cost (Figure 5b). On the other hand, considering diversion only (Scenario
2) can have a better effect than rerouting. For example, in instance 6, using diversion only led to
less increase in total delay (0.67%) compared to the 3.6% increase in total delay using rerouting
only for the same reduction in cancellations. This comes from the fact that diversion may shift
flights to less-congested airports. Compared to ATFM without rerouting and diversion, considering
diversion helps to reduce total cost by an average of 1.37% (Figure 5b).
Combining both decisions, i.e. rerouting and diversion, (Scenario 3), achieves better performance
than the ATFM without rerouting and diversion. For example, in the instances with zero cancella-
tions (instance 1, 2 and 5), considered rerouting and diversion together resulted in less total delay
than considering only rerouting or only diversion (Table 5). The increase in total delay is always
associated with a decrease in percentage of cancellations, i.e. an overall improvement. Combining
rerouting and diversion decisions results in an average total cost reduction of 6.35% (Figure 5b), a
maximum delay reduction of 7.5%, and a maximum cancellations reduction of 23.8% (Figure 5a).
Figure 6 Impact of diversion cost on network decisions
Figure 6 illustrates how total delays, reroutings and diversions change when diversion cost
changes in Scenario 3. Network decisions were found to be insensitive to the increase in diversion
cost. In addition, total delay decreases when diversion cost is reduced by at least 20%, and rerout-
ing changes when diversion cost is reduced by at least 30%. Reducing the diversion cost by 50%
increases total diversions by an average of 30% and increases reroutings by 2% but decreases total
delay by an average of 0.2%.
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Table 5 Effect of different ATFM network features on the total delay, rerouting, diversion and cancellation
decisions
GD 1 AD 2 RF 3 DF 4 CF 5 GD AD RF DF CF
Instance 1 Instance 2
Baseline* 155 267 0 0 0 Baseline 605 48 0 0 0
Scenario 1 138 261 2 0 0 Scenario 1 596 48 1 0 0
Scenario 2 155 267 0 0 0 Scenario 2 580 50 0 2 0
Scenario 3 138 261 2 0 0 Scenario 3 571 50 1 2 0
Instance 3 Instance 4
Baseline 1546 58 0 0 24 Baseline 1169 164 0 0 45
Scenario 1 1630 84 16 0 19 Scenario 1 1262 198 6 0 39
Scenario 2 1523 58 0 1 24 Scenario 2 1187 167 0 2 43
Scenario 3 1607 84 16 1 19 Scenario 3 1282 201 6 2 37
Instance 5 Instance 6
Baseline 1558 140 0 0 0 Baseline 2699 5 0 0 21
Scenario 1 1423 147 14 0 0 Scenario 1 2791 9 6 0 18
Scenario 2 1558 140 0 0 0 Scenario 2 2718 4 0 7 18
Scenario 3 1423 147 14 0 0 Scenario 3 2743 7 5 7 16
1 GD: Total ground delay
2 AD: Total air delay
3 RF: Total rerouted flights
4 DF: Total diverted flights
5 CF: Total canceled flights
* Baseline represents ATFM without rerouting and diversion, and with overtak-
ing
Observation 3: Reducing the ground delay cost has much more impact than reducing
the air delay cost.
In Observation 3, we examine the effect of reducing ground delay cost, air delay cost, or both ground
delay cost and air delay cost on the other network decisions (rerouting, diversion and cancellation).
We tested 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% reductions in delay costs.
Figure 7 shows how delay costs interact with network decisions. Figure 7a shows the cost changes
with respect to each reduction scenario, and Figure 7b illustrates the impact of reducing the delay
costs by 50% on the number of total delays, reroutings, diversions and cancellations. The changes
in total delays, reroutings, diversions and cancellations are calculated based on the ATFM scenario
with rerouting and diversion, with Cfair = AC2190 per time-period and C
f
ground = AC1350 per time-
period.
Reducing air delay costs had less impact on network decisions than reducing ground delay costs.
Reducing ground delay costs by 50% reduced the cost of rerouting, diversion, cancellation, and
overtaking by 41% on average, compared to just 13% when reducing air delay costs by the same
50% (Figure 7a). In addition, reducing ground and air delay costs by 50% reduced costs from
the other network decisions by an average of 37%, which is less than the effect obtained when
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(a) Impact of reducing delay costs on network costs
(b) Impact of reducing delay costs by 50% on the total delays, reroutings, diversions and cancella-
tions
Figure 7 Interactions of delay cost coefficients with reroutings, diversions and cancellations
reducing ground delays only (i.e. 41%). This slight difference is explained by the increase in delays,
as reducing ground delay cost increased total delays by 16% compared to 12.6% when varying both
ground and air delay costs.
Reducing the cost of ground delay by 50% reduced the need for rerouting by up to 20% and the
need for diversions by up to 100% (Figure 7b) in the fully saturated network, i.e. when no further
reduction in cancellations can be achieved. Note that network saturation was checked by setting
the cost parameters to zero and observing the change in number of cancellations.
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For the analyzed instances, we observed the following trade-offs: 1) for each 1% reduction in
ground delay cost, total delays increase by 0.33% and the cost of the other decisions decreases by
1%; 2) for each 1% reduction in both ground and air delay costs, total delays increase by 0.23%
and the cost of the other decisions decreases by 0.74%; 3) for each 1% reduction in air delay cost
(beyond 30%), total delays increase by 0.25% and the cost of the other decisions decreases by
0.61%.
Observation 4: Overtaking cost impacts all network decisions, and a small increase
in total cost can significantly increase total network fairness.
We varied the overtaking cost (CfRairport = C
f
Rsector = AC4600) by multiplying it by the following























,0) in order to understand how network efficiency
is affected by fairness between flights.
Figure 8 illustrates the price of fairness (percentage change in total cost) and the improvement
in fairness in the network (percentage reduction in total overtaking). Note that the total cost is
calculated based on ground and air delays, rerouting, diversion and cancellation costs. The baseline
for calculating the price of fairness is the ATFM without overtaking.
Network fairness improved significantly at a very small price (e.g. the solution of ROV =
1
50
indicated by the red circle in the figure). In other words, an 80%-plus improvement in network
fairness can be achieved at the expense of just a 5% increase in total cost for all the instances.
The trade-off between improving network fairness and total network cost increase can be derived
from Figure 8. For example, an average increase of 2.5% in the total cost will result in a 24.1%
improvement in network fairness for instance 1, while for instance 2, an average improvement of
81.7% in network fairness is associated with an average increase of 0.15% in total cost.
Table 6 shows that varying the overtaking costs affects not only ground and air delays but
also reroutings, diversions and cancellations. Rerouting, diversion and cancellation decisions are
therefore used to reduce overtaking between flights and thus increase network fairness. However,
assigning high overtaking costs enhances network fairness but may result in cancelling some flights
to reduce overtaking, which might be undesirable (as in instance 6, Table 6). Limiting the overtaking
costs to small values will help avoid any possibility of flight cancellations due to fairness.
Observation 5: Airline fairness improvements can potentially be achieved at minimal
cost.
For Observation 5, we examined the effect of considering fairness among airlines by trying to
balance the total cost per flight for each airline. This analysis was carried out under three fairness
coefficients Π = 0, 1, 1000, which correspond to no fairness, low fairness, and high fairness among
airlines. Figure 9 shows the degree of fairness in each instance and for each airline. Note that the
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Table 6 Effect of overtaking costs on network decisions
ROV GD
1 AD2 RF3 DF4 CF5 TO6 ROV GD AD RF DF CF TO
Instance 1 Instance 2
0 73 220 1 0 0 1274 0 567 50 1 2 0 356
1/CfRsector 73 220 1 0 0 1151 1/C
f
Rsector
567 50 1 2 0 83
1/50 48 245 1 0 0 264 1/50 569 50 1 2 0 17
1/20 40 254 1 0 0 188 1/20 570 50 1 2 0 5
1/10 45 256 1 0 0 154 1/10 571 50 1 2 0 0
1/7 57 255 2 0 0 131 1/7 571 50 1 2 0 0
1/6 67 255 3 0 0 110 1/6 571 50 1 2 0 0
1/5 71 255 3 0 0 104 1/5 571 50 1 2 0 0
1/4 85 255 1 1 0 81 1/4 571 50 1 2 0 0
1/3 125 255 1 1 0 41 1/3 571 50 1 2 0 0
1/2 131 256 2 0 0 38 1/2 571 50 1 2 0 0
1 138 261 2 0 0 32 1 571 50 1 2 0 0
Instance 3 Instance 4
0 1567 55 15 2 19 1883 0 1304 148 6 2 37 949
1/CfRsector 1567 55 15 2 19 1113 1/C
f
Rsector
1304 148 6 2 37 200
1/50 1563 68 15 2 19 373 1/50 1302 150 6 2 37 166
1/20 1589 74 16 1 19 91 1/20 1292 160 6 2 37 93
1/10 1596 78 16 1 19 31 1/10 1283 171 6 2 37 60
1/7 1598 78 16 1 19 26 1/7 1286 171 6 2 37 53
1/6 1604 79 16 1 19 11 1/6 1288 171 6 2 37 49
1/5 1602 81 16 1 19 9 1/5 1288 173 6 2 37 44
1/4 1602 81 16 1 19 9 1/4 1281 196 6 2 37 7
1/3 1606 81 16 1 19 5 1/3 1282 198 6 2 37 3
1/2 1607 84 16 1 19 1 1/2 1282 201 6 2 37 0
1 1607 84 16 1 19 1 1 1282 201 6 2 37 0
Instance 5 Instance 6
0 1428 111 14 0 0 62680 0 2785 7 6 7 13 8292
1/CfRsector 1428 111 14 0 0 3085 1/C
f
Rsector
2785 7 6 7 13 5583
1/50 1420 142 14 0 0 101 1/50 2757 13 5 7 15 359
1/20 1420 147 14 0 0 17 1/20 2710 16 5 7 16 63
1/10 1418 150 14 0 0 3 1/10 2728 12 5 7 16 14
1/7 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1/7 2739 7 5 7 16 7
1/6 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1/6 2742 7 5 7 16 1
1/5 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1/5 2742 7 5 7 16 1
1/4 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1/4 2742 7 5 7 16 1
1/3 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1/3 2743 7 5 7 16 0
1/2 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1/2 2743 7 5 7 16 0
1 1424 147 14 0 0 0 1 2743 7 5 7 16 0
1 GD: Total ground delay
2 AD: Total air delay
3 RF: Total rerouted flights
4 DF: Total diverted flights
5 CF: Total canceled flights
6 TO: Total overtaking
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Figure 8 Effect of changing overtaking costs on total network cost: the red circle (o) represents the solution of
ROV = 1/50
degree of fairness (DOFh) of airline h is calculated as DOFh = 1− |Bh−BB |, where Bh is the total
cost of airline h in Equation (19) and B is the average cost of all airlines in Equation (20). The
degree of fairness ranges from 0 (very far from the mean) to 1 (close to the mean). The overall
degree of fairness is the average degree of fairness of all airlines, and is reported in Figure 9.
Figure 9 Degree of fairness among airlines: (a) Π = 0, (b) Π = 1, and (c) Π = 1000. The value above each
instance shows the average degree of fairness
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Figure 10 shows the price of fairness (calculated as 100× |C(Π=0)−C(Π=i)|
C(Π=0)
) for each fairness coeffi-
cient and each instance. The price of fairness is the relative percentage increase in cost associated
with moving from an efficient system to a fair one (Bertsimas, Farias, and Trichakis 2012). Note
that C represents the optimal value of Equation (1), and Π = i represents the values of the fairness
coefficients as stated above. The price mark-up required to achieve full fairness (Π = 1000) ranges
between 0.2% and 3% of the total cost of the efficient solution (Figure 10). Moreover, considering
airline fairness with a small coefficient (Π = 1) enhances fairness by an average of 13% at no added
cost compared to the case of not considering airline fairness (Π = 0).
Figure 10 Boundaries of the price of fairness
Observation 6: Reducing the cost of delays and overtaking by 1% increases the costs
of rerouting, diversion and cancellation by 1.74%.
As the proposed model suggests having a central authority that can control all decisions, the
weights of the two groups of decisions can be used to analyze the impact of changing the decisions
of one group on the other group. Here we examine the impact of reducing delays and overtaking on
rerouting, diversion and cancellation. We do so by varying the weights π1 and π2 in the objective
function (1) from 0.05 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05. Note that varying the weights can be seen
as changing the costs. For instance, the case of π1 = 0.75 and π2 = 0.25 corresponds to reducing





Figure 11 shows the trade-off between the costs of delays and overtaking (x-axis) and the costs
of rerouting, diversion and cancellation (y-axis). On average, reducing delays and overtaking by
1% (in terms of cost) increases the costs of rerouting, diversion and cancellation by 1.74%.
Figure 12 shows the impact of varying the importance weight (π1) on the cost of delays and
overtaking, the cost of rerouting, diversion and cancellation, and the total network cost. The lowest
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Figure 11 Trade-off between costs of delays and overtaking and costs of rerouting, diversion and cancellation
Figure 12 Impact of changing the importance weight (π1) on the ATFM decisions cost, airline decisions cost,
and total network cost
total network cost is achieved at π1 = 0.5. Note that total network cost increases slightly between
π1= 0.05 and 0.45. This slight increase ranges from 0.5% to 1.8% for instances 1 through 5 and
9% for instance 6 compared to the total cost at π1 = 0.5 (the lowest cost). We conclude that the
increase in total network cost becomes significant when high importance is given to the delay and
overtaking decisions (π1>0.6), which greatly increases the need for the other decisions (rerouting,
diversion and cancellation) to keep the total network cost as low as possible.
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8. Conclusions
In this paper, we developed an ATFM model that allows decisions such as rerouting and diversion
in addition to air delays and ground holdings. We also considered the en-route flights that already
exist in airspace at a given point in time without limiting the model to only the flights scheduled
to depart. Moreover, we considered fairness and equity among flights by limiting overtaking, and
we considered fairness in delay distribution by using super-linear cost coefficients. A model variant
that incorporated airline fairness was formulated. We provided a modified fix-and-relax heuristic
to solve large-sized instances. Our numerical experiments showed that this model, with different
rerouting options, can serve to significantly reduce the number of canceled flights and total delays
by providing more alternatives than ground and air delays, which thus offers decision-makers a
more flexible approach. The proposed model suggests having a central authority to control network
decisions to increase airspace efficiency. Adopting this model can help achieve better airspace
utilization, as it offers decision-makers more decisions to act on and tells them if there is a need
to suggest new airspace routes in order to reduce the number of canceled flights when networks
are fully saturated. Our experiments revealed that by carefully selecting the overtaking penalty,
it is possible to improve inter-flight fairness without significantly increasing system cost. As for
inter-airline fairness, we observed that it can be incorporated at a small increase in total network
cost. The model revealed that decreasing the cost of delays and overtaking by 1% increases the
cost of rerouting, diversion and cancellation by 1.74%. The combined effect of the central authority
with the fairness distribution can bring better utilization of the airspace and a fairer distribution
of the cost across the stakeholders.
The model is currently limited to deterministic capacities. Future research could consider weather
effects on capacities. Further directions for research would be to optimize the airspace configuration
in the ATFM context, and to pursue the development and analysis of a mechanism to manage and
control the decisions under the central authority approach. Further investigations are needed to
consider technical and administrative constraints.
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